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Traders with short horizons and privately known trading limits inter-
act in a market for a risky asset. Risk-averse, long horizon traders sup-
ply a downward sloping residual demand curve that face the short-horizon
traders. When the price falls close to the trading limits of the short horizon
traders, selling of the risky asset by any trader increases the incentives for
others to sell. Sales become mutually reinforcing among the short term
traders, and payoffs analogous to a bank run are generated. A “liquidity
black hole” is the analogue of the run outcome in a bank run model. Short
horizon traders sell because others sell. Using global game techniques, this
paper solves for the unique trigger point at which the liquidity black hole
comes into existence. Empirical implications include the sharp V-shaped
pattern in prices around the time of the liquidity black hole.
∗This is a much revised version of an earlier paper circulated under the title “Market Risk with
Interdependent Choice”. We thank Guillaume Plantin, Jon Danielsson, Amil Dasgupta, Markus
Brunnermeier, Jean-Pierre Zigrand and Frank Heinemann for comments at various stages of this
project.
1. Introduction
Occasionally, financial markets experience episodes of turbulence of such an ex-
treme kind that it appears to stop functioning. Such episodes are marked by a
heavily one-sided order flow, rapid price changes, and financial distress on the part
of many of the traders. The 1987 stock market crash is perhaps the most glaring
example of such an episode, but there are other, more recent examples such as
the collapse of the dollar against the yen on October 7th, 1998, and instances of
distressed trading in some fixed income markets during the LTCM crisis in the
summer of 1998. Practitioners dub such episodes as “liquidity holes” or, more
dramatically, “liquidity black holes” (Taleb (1997, pp. 68-9), Persaud (2001)).
Liquidity black holes are not simply instances of large price changes. Public
announcements of important macroeconomic statistics, such as the U.S. employ-
ment report or GDP growth estimates, are sometimes marked by large, discrete
price changes at the time of announcement. However, such price changes are
arguably the signs of a smoothly functioning market that is able to incorporate
new information quickly. The market typically finds composure quite rapidly
after such discrete price changes, as shown by Fleming and Remolona (1999) for
the US Treasury securities market.
In contrast, liquidity black holes have the feature that they seem to gather
momentum from the endogenous responses of the market participants themselves.
Rather like a tropical storm, they appear to gather more energy as they develop.
Part of the explanation for the endogenous feedback mechanism lies in the idea
that the incentives facing traders undergo changes when prices change. For
instance, market distress can feed on itself. When asset prices fall, some traders
may get close to their trading limits and are induced to sell. But this selling
pressure sets off further downward pressure on asset prices, which induces a further
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round of selling, and so on. Portfolio insurance based on delta-hedging rules is
perhaps the best-known example of such feedback, but similar forces will operate
whenever traders face constraints on their behaviour that shorten their decision
horizons. Daily trading limits and other controls on traders’ discretion arise as a
response to agency problems within a financial institution, and are there for good
reason. However, they have the effect of shortening the decision horizons of the
traders.
In what follows, we study traders with short decision horizons who have exoge-
nously given trading limits. Their short decision horizon arises from the threat
that a breach of the trading limit results in dismissal - a bad outcome for the
trader. However, the trading limit of each trader is private information to that
trader. Also, although the trading limits across traders can differ, they are closely
correlated, ex ante. The traders interact in a market for a risky asset, where risk-
averse, long horizon traders supply a downward sloping residual demand curve.
When the price falls close to the trading limits of the short horizon traders, selling
of the risky asset by any trader increases the incentives for others to sell. This is
because sales tend to drive down the market-clearing price, and the probability
of breaching one’s own trading limit increases. This sharpens the incentives for
other traders to sell. In this way, sales become reinforcing between the short term
traders. In particular, the payoffs facing the short horizon traders are analogous
to a bank run game. A “liquidity black hole” is the analogue of the run outcome
in a bank run model. Short horizon traders sell because others sell.
If the trading limits were common knowledge, the payoffs have the potential
to generate multiple equilibria. Traders sell if they believe others sell, but if they
believe that others will hold their nerve and not sell, they will refrain from selling.
Such multiplicity of equilibria is a well-known feature of the bank run model of
Diamond and Dybvig (1983). However, when trading limits are not common
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knowledge, as is more reasonable, the global game techniques of Morris and Shin
(1998, 2003) and Goldstein and Pauzner (2000) can be employed to solve for the
unique trigger point at which the liquidity black hole comes into existence.1
The idea that the residual demand curve facing active traders is not infinitely
elastic was suggested by Grossman and Miller (1988), who posited a role for risk-
averse market makers who accommodate order flows and are compensated with
higher expected return. Campbell, Grossman, and Wang (1993) find evidence
consistent with this hypothesis by showing that returns accompanied by high
volume tend to be reversed more strongly. Pastor and Stambaugh (2002) provide
further evidence for this hypothesis by finding a role for a liquidity factor in an
empirical asset pricing model, based on the idea that price reversals often follow
liquidity shortages. Bernardo and Welch (2001) and Brunnermeier and Pedersen
(2002) have used this device in modelling limited liquidity facing active traders2.
More generally, the limited capacity of the market to absorb sales of assets has
figured prominently in the literature on banking and financial crises (see Allen and
Gale (2001), Gorton and Huang (2003) and Schnabel and Shin (2002)), where the
price repercussions of asset sales have important adverse welfare consequences.
Similarly, the ineffecient liquidation of long assets in Diamond and Rajan (2000)
has an analogous effect. The shortage of aggregate liquidity that such liquidations
bring about can generate contagious failures in the banking system.
1Global game techniques have been in use in economics for some time, but they are less well
established in the finance literature. Some exceptions include Abreu and Brunnermeier (2003),
Plantin (2003) and Bruche (2002).
2Lustig (2001) emphasizes solvency constraints in giving rise to a liquidity-risk factor in
addition to aggregate consumption risk. Acharya and Pedersen (2002) develop a model in
which each asset’s return is net of a stochastic liquidity cost, and expected returns are related
to return covariances with the aggregate liquidity cost (as well as to three other covariances).
Gromb and Vayanos (2002) build on the intuitions of Shleifer and Vishny (1997) and show that
margin constraints have a similar effect in limiting the ability of arbitrageurs to exploit price
differences. Holmström and Tirole (2001) propose a role for a related notion of liquidity arising
from the limited pledgeability of assets held by firms due to agency problems.
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Some market microstructure studies show evidence consistent with an endoge-
nous trading response that magnifies the initial price change. Cohen and Shin
(2001) show that the US Treasury securities market exhibit evidence of positive
feedback trading during periods of rapid price changes and heavy order flow. In-
deed, even for macroeconomic announcements, Evans and Lyons (2003) find that
the foreign exchange market relies on the order flow of the traders in order to
interpret the significance of the macro announcement. Hasbrouck (2000) finds
that a flow of new market orders for a stock are accompanied by the withdrawal of
limit orders on the opposite side. Danielsson and Payne’s (2001) study of foreign
exchange trading on the Reuters 2000 trading system shows how the demand or
supply curve disappears from the market when the price is moving against it, only
to reappear when the market has regained composure. The interpretation that
emerges from these studies is that smaller versions of such liquidity gaps are per-
vasive in active markets - that the market undergoes many “mini liquidity gaps”
several times per day.
The next section presents the model. We then proceed to solve for the equi-
librium in the trading game using global game techniques. We conclude with a
discussion of the empirical implications and the endogenous nature of market risk.
2. Model
An asset is traded at two consecutive dates, and then is liquidated. We index the
two trading dates by 1 and 2. The liquidation value of the asset at date 2 when
viewed from date 0 is given by
v + z (2.1)
where v and z are two independent random variables. z is normally distributed
with mean zero and variance σ2, and is realized after trading at date 2. v is
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realized after trading at date 1. We do not need to impose any assumptions on
the distribution of v. The important feature for our exercise is that, at date 1
(after the realization of v), the liquidation value of the asset is normal with mean
v and variance σ2.
There are two groups of traders in the market, and the realization of v at
date 1 is common knowledge among all of them. There is, first, a continuum
of risk neutral traders of measure 1. Each trader holds 1 unit of the asset.
We may think of them as proprietary traders (e.g. at an investment bank or
hedge fund). They are subject to an incentive contract in which their payoff is
proportional to the final liquidation value of the asset. However, these traders are
also subject to a loss limit at date 1, as will be described in more detail below. If a
trader’s loss between dates 0 and 1 exceeds this limit, then the trader is dismissed.
Dismissal is a bad outcome for the trader, and the trader’s decision reflects the
tradeoff between keeping his trading position open (and reaping the rewards if
the liquidation value of the asset is high), against the risk of dismissal at date 1
if his loss limit is breached at date 1. We do not model explicitly the agency
problems that motivate the loss limit. The loss limit is taken to be exogenous for
our purpose.
Alongside this group of risk-neutral traders is a risk-averse market-making sec-
tor of the economy. Themarket-making sector provides the residual demand curve
facing the risk-neutral traders as a whole, in the manner envisaged by Grossman
and Miller (1988) and Campbell, Grossman and Wang (1993).
We represent the market-making sector by means of a representative trader
with constant absolute risk aversion γ who posts limit buy orders for the asset
at date 1 that coincides with his competitive demand curve. At date 1 (after v
is realized), the liquidation value of the asset is normally distributed with mean
v and variance σ2. From the linearity of demand with Gaussian uncertainty
6





where p is the price of the asset at date 1. Thus, if the aggregate net supply of
the asset from the risk-neutral traders is s, price at date 1 satisfies
p = v − cs (2.2)
where c is the constant γσ2. Since the market-making sector is risk-averse, it
must be compensated for taking over the risky asset at date 1, so that the price
of the asset falls short of its expected payoff by the amount cs.
2.1. Loss limits
In the absence of any artificial impediments, the efficient allocation is for the risk-
neutral traders to hold all of the risky asset. However, the risk-neutral traders
are subject to a loss limit that constrains their actions. The loss limit is a trigger
price or “stop price” qi for trader i such that if
p < qi
then trader i is dismissed at date 1. Dismissal is a bad outcome for the trader,
and results in a payoff of 0. The loss limits of the traders should be construed
as being determined in part by the overall risk position and portfolio composition
of their employers. Loss limits therefore differ across traders, and information
regarding such limits are closely guarded. Among other things, the loss limits
fail to be common knowledge among the traders. This will be the crucial feature
of our model that drives the main results. We will also assume that, conditional
on being dismissed, the trader prefers to maximize the value of his trading book.
The idea here is that the trader is traded more leniently if the loss is smaller.
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We will model the loss limits as random variables that are closely correlated
across the traders. Trader i’s loss limit qi is given by
qi = θ + ηi (2.3)





ing the common component of all loss limits. The idiosyncratic component of
i’s loss limit is given by the random variable ηi, which is uniformly distributed
with support [−ε, ε], and where ηi and ηj for i 6= j are independent, and ηi is
independent of θ. Crucially, trader i knows only of his own loss limit qi. He
must infer the loss limits of the other traders, based on his knowledge of the joint
distribution of {qj}, and his own loss limit qi.
2.2. Execution of sell orders
The trading at date 1 takes place by matching the sales of the risk-neutral traders
with the limit buy orders posted by the market-making sector. However, the
sequence in which the sell orders are executed is not under the control of the
sellers. We will assume that if the aggregate sale of the asset by the risk-neutral
traders is s, then a seller’s place in the queue for execution is uniformly distributed
in the interval [0, s]. Thus the expected price at which trader i’s sell order is




and depends on the aggregate sale s. This feature of our model captures two
ingredients. The first is the idea that the price received by a seller depends on
the amount sold by other traders. When there is a flood of sell orders (large s),
then the sale price that can be expected is low. The second ingredient is the
departure from the assumption that the transaction price is known with certainty
when a trader decides to sell. Even though traders may have a good indication
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of the price that they can expect by selling (say, through indicative prices), the
actual execution price cannot be guaranteed, and will depend on the overall selling
pressure in the market. This second feature - the uncertainty of transactions price
- is an important feature of a market under stress, and is emphasized by many
practitioners (see for instance, Kaufman (2000, pp.79-80), Taleb (1997, 68-9)).
The payoff to a seller now depends on whether the execution price is high
enough as not to breach the loss limit. Let us denote by ŝi the largest value of
aggregate sales s that guarantees that trader i can execute his sell order without
breaching the loss limit. That is, ŝi is defined in terms of the equation:
qi = v − cŝi (2.5)
where the expression on the right hand side is the lowest possible price received by
a seller when the aggregate sale is ŝi. Thus, whenever s ≤ ŝi, trader i’s expected
payoff to selling is given by (2.4). However, when s > ŝi, there is a positive
probability that the loss limit is breached, which leads to the bad payoff of 0.









If trader i decides to hold on to the asset, then the payoff is given by the
liquidation value of the asset at date 2 if the loss limit is not breached, and 0 if
it is breached. Thus, the expected payoff to trader i of holding the asset, as a
function of aggregate sales s, is
u (s) =
½
v if s ≤ ŝi
0 if s > ŝi
(2.7)
Bringing together (2.4) and (2.6), we can write the expected payoff of trader i
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if s > ŝi
(2.8)
The payoffs are depicted in Figure 2.1. Holding the asset does better when s < ŝi,
but selling the asset does better when s > ŝi. The trader’s optimal action depends






































































































































At date 1, v is realized, and is common knowledge among all traders. Thus, at
date 1, it is common knowledge that the liquidation value at date 2 has mean v
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and variance σ2. Each trader decides whether to sell or hold the asset on the basis
of the realization of v and his own loss limit. Trader i’s strategy is a function
(v, qi) 7−→ {hold, sell}
that maps realizations of v and qi to a trading decision. When v is either very
high or very low, trader i has a dominant action. When v is very high relative
to qi (so that the realization of v is considerably higher than the loss limit for i),
trader i will prefer to hold. In particular, since the period 1 price p cannot fall
below v − c, trader i’s dominant action is to hold when:
v ≥ qi + c (3.1)
This is because the loss limit for trader i will not be breached even if all other
traders sell. Conversely, when v is so low that
v < qi (3.2)
then the loss limit is breached even if all other traders hold. Given our assumption
that the traders prefers to maximize the value of his trading book conditional
on being dismissed, selling is the dominant action when v < qi. However, for
intermediate values of v where
qi ≤ v < qi + c (3.3)
trader i’s optimal action depends on the incidence of selling by other traders. If
trader i believes that others are selling, he will sell also. If, however, the others
are not selling, then he will hold. If the loss limits were common knowledge,
then such interdependence of actions would lead to multiple equilibria, and an
indeterminacy in the predicted outcome. When the loss limits are not common
knowledge (as in our case), we can largely eliminate the multiplicity of equilibria
through global game techniques.
11
In particular, we will solve for the unique equilibrium in threshold strategies
in which trader i has the threshold v∗ (qi) for v that depends on his own loss limit
qi such that the equilibrium strategy is given by
(v, qi) 7−→
½
hold if v ≥ v∗ (qi)
sell if v < v∗ (qi)
(3.4)
In other words, v∗ (qi) is the trigger level of v for trader i such that he sells if
and only if v falls below this critical level. We will show that there is precisely
one equilibrium of this kind, and proceed to solve for it by solving for the trigger
points {v∗ (qi)}. Our claim can be summarized in terms of the following theorem.
Theorem 1. There is an equilibrium in threshold strategies where the threshold
v∗ (qi) for trader i is given by the unique value of v that solves
v − qi = c exp
½
qi − v
2 (v + qi)
¾
(3.5)
There is no other threshold equilibrium.
The left hand side of (3.5) is increasing in v and passes through the origin,
while the right hand side is decreasing in v and passes through (0, c), so that there
is a unique solution to (3.5). At this solution, we must have v − qi > 0, so that
the trigger point v∗ (qi) is strictly above the loss limit qi. Traders adopt a pre-
emptive selling strategy in which the trigger level leaves a “margin for prudence”.
The intuition here is that a trader anticipates the negative consequences of other
traders selling. Other traders’ pre-emptive selling strategy must be met by a
pre-emptive selling strategy on my part. In equilibrium, every trader adopts an
aggressive, pre-emptive selling strategy because others do so. If the traders have
long decision horizons, they can ignore the short-term fluctuations in price and
hold the asset for its fundamental value. However, traders subject to a loss limit
have a short decision horizon. Even though the fundamentals are good, short term
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price fluctuations can cost him his job. Thus, loss limits inevitably shorten the
decision horizon of the traders. The fact there there is a pre-emptive equilibrium
of this kind is perhaps not so remarkable. However, what is of interest is the fact
that there is no other threshold equilibrium. In particular, the “nice” strategy
in which the traders disarm by collectively lowering their threshold points v∗ (qi)
down to their loss limits qi cannot figure in any equilibrium behaviour.



































































































Figure 3.1: v∗ as a function of c. qi = 1
Figure 3.1 plots v∗ as a function of the parameter c as given by (3.5), while
fixing qi = 1. Recall that c = γσ2, where γ is the coefficient of absolute risk
aversion. We can see that the critical value v∗ can be substantially higher than
the loss limit (given by 1). When v is very high, so that v − c > qi, holding the
asset is the dominant action. This dominance region is the area above the upward
sloping dashed line in figure 3.1. Conversely when v < qi, the dominant action is
to sell, and this area is indicated as the region below the horizontal dashed line.
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The large “wedge” between these two dominance regions is the region in which
the outcome depends on the resolution of the strategic trading game between the
traders. The equilibrium trigger point v∗ bisects this wedge, and determines
whether trader i holds or sells. The solid line plots the equilibrium trigger point
given by the solution to (3.5).
Technically, the global game analysed here does not conform to the canonical
case discussed in Morris and Shin (2003) in which the payoffs satisfy strategic
complementarity, and uniqueness can be proved by the iterated deletion of domi-
nated strategies. In our game, the payoff difference between holding and selling is
not a monotonic function of s. We can see this best from figure 2.1. The payoff
difference rises initially, but then drops discontinuously, and then rises thereafter,
much like the bank run game of Goldstein and Pauzner (2000). Our argument
for the uniqueness of the threshold equilibrium rests on the interaction between
strategic uncertainty (uncertainty concerning the actions of other traders) and
fundamental uncertainty (uncertainty concerning the fundamentals). Irrespec-
tive of the severity of fundamental uncertainty, the strategic uncertainty persists
in equilibrium, and the pre-emptive action of the traders reflects the optimal re-
sponse to strategic uncertainty. Our solution method below will bring this feature
out explicitly.
3.1. Strategic uncertainty
The payoff difference between holding the asset and selling the asset when ag-
gregate sales are s is given by u (s) − w (s). The expected payoff advantage of
holding the asset over selling it is given byZ 1
0
f (s|v, qi) [u (s)− w (s)] ds
where f (s|v, qi) is the density over the equilibrium value of s (the proportion of
traders who sell) conditional on v and trader i’s own loss limit qi. Trader i will
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hold if the integral is positive, and sell if it is negative. Thus, a direct way to
solve for our equilibrium is to solve for the density f (s|v, qi).
It is convenient to view the trader’s threshold strategy as the choice of a
threshold for qi as a function of v. Thus, let us fix v and suppose that all traders
follow the threshold strategy around q∗, so that trader i sells if qi > q∗ and holds
if qi ≤ q∗. Suppose that trader i’s loss limit qi happens to be exactly q∗. We will
derive trader i’s subjective density over the aggregate sales s. Since the traders
have unit measure, aggregate sales s is given by the proportion of traders who sell.
From trader i’s point of view, s is a random variable with support on the unit
interval [0, 1]. The cumulative distribution function over s viewed from trader i’s
viewpoint can be obtained from the answer to the following question.
“My loss limit is q∗. What is the probability that s is less than z?” (Q)
The answer to this question will yield F (z|q∗) - the probability that the pro-
portion of traders who sell is at most z, conditional on qi = q∗. Since all traders
are hypothesized to be using the threshold strategy around q∗, the proportion
of traders who sell is given by the proportion of traders whose loss limits have
realizations to the right of q∗. When the common element of the loss limits is θ,
the individual loss limits are distributed uniformly over the interval [θ − ε, θ + ε].
The traders who sell are those whose loss limits are above q∗. Hence,
s =
θ + ε− q∗
2ε
When do we have s < z? This happens when θ is low enough, so that the area
under the density to the right of q∗ is squeezed to a size below z. There is a value
of θ at which s is precisely equal to z. This is when θ = θ∗, where
θ∗ = q∗ − ε+ 2εz
15
We have s < z if and only if θ < θ∗. Thus, we can answer question (Q) by finding
the posterior probability that θ < θ∗.
For this, we must turn to trader i’s posterior density over θ conditional on
his loss limit being q∗. This posterior density is uniform over the interval
[q∗ − ε, q∗ + ε]. This is because the ex ante distribution over θ is uniform and
the idiosyncratic element of the loss limit is uniformly distributed around θ. The
probability that θ < θ∗ is then the area under the posterior density over θ to the
left of θ∗. This is,




q∗ − ε+ 2εz − (q∗ − ε)
2ε
= z
In other words, the probability that s < z conditional on loss limit q∗ is exactly
z. The cumulative distribution function F (z|q∗) is the identity function:
F (z|q∗) = z (3.7)
The density over s is then obtained by differentiation.
f (s|q∗) = 1 for all s (3.8)
The density over s is uniform. The noteworthy feature of this result that the
constant ε does not enter into the expression for the density over s. No matter
how small or large is the dispersion of loss limits, s has the uniform density over the
unit interval [0, 1]. In the limit as ε→ 0, every trader’s loss limit converges to θ.
Thus, fundamental uncertainty disappears. Everyone’s loss limit converges to the
common element θ, and everyone knows this fact. And yet, even as fundamental
uncertainty disappears, the strategic uncertainty is unchanged.
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3.2. Solving for Equilibrium Threshold
Having found the conditional density over s at the threshold point q∗, we can now
return to the payoffs of the game. We noted earlier that the expected payoff
advantage to holding the asset is given byZ 1
0
f (s|v, qi) [u (s)− w (s)] ds
At the threshold point q∗, we have just shown that the density f (s|v, qi) is uniform.
In addition, the trader is indifferent between holding and selling. Thus, at the
threshold point, we have Z 1
0
[u (s)− w (s)] ds = 0
From this equation, we can solve for the threshold point. Figure 3.2 illustrates
the argument. The integral of the payoff difference with respect to a uniform
density over s must be equal to zero. This means that the area labelled A in
figure 3.2 must be equal to the area labelled B.


















v − q∗ = 2 (v + q∗) log c
v − q∗
Re-arranging this equation gives (3.5) of theorem 1. There is a unique solution
to this equation as already noted, where v > q∗.
So far, we have shown that if all traders follow the threshold strategy around
q∗, then a trader is indifferent between holding and selling given the threshold loss
limit q∗. We must show that if qi > q∗, trader i prefers to sell, and if qi < q∗,

































































































































Figure 3.2: Expected Payoffs in Equilibrium
4. Discussion
Liquidity black holes are associated with a sharp V-shaped price path for prices.
The price at date 1 is given by v − cs, while the expected value of the asset at
date 1 is v. Thus, the expected return from date 1 to date 2 is given by v
v−cs . In
the limiting case, where the loss limits are perfectly correlated across traders, s
takes the value 1 below v∗, and takes the value 0 above v∗. Thus, when there is
a liquidity black hole at date 1, the expected return is
v
v − c
which is strictly larger than the actuarially fair rate of 1 for risk-netural traders.
The larger is c, the greater is the likely bounce in price. The parameter c is
given by c = γσ2, where γ is the coefficient of absolute risk aversion and σ2 is
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the variance of the fundamentals. Since c gives the slope of the residual demand
curve facing the active traders, we can interpret c as representing the degree of
illiquidity of the market. The larger is c, the smaller is the capacity to absorb
the selling pressure from the active traders. Thus, when a liquidity black hole
comes into existence, a large c is associated with a sharper decline in prices, and
a commensurate bounce back in prices in the final period.
Another implication of our model is that the trading volume at the time of
the liquidity black hole and its aftermath will be considerable. When the market
strikes the liquidity black hole, the whole of the asset holding in the risky asset
changes hands from the risk-neutral short horizon traders to the risk-averse market
making sector. Although we have not modelled the dynamics, we could envisage
that immediately afterwards, once the loss limits have been adjusted down given
the new price, there will be an immediate reversal of the trades in which the
risky asset ends up back in the hands of the risk neutral traders once more. The
large trading volume that is generated by these reversals will be associated with
the sharp V-shaped price dynamics already noted. The association between
the V-shaped pattern in prices and the large trading volume is consistent with
the evidence found in Campbell, Grossman and Wang (1993) and Pastor and
Stambaugh (2002).
Traders who are aware of their environment take account of limited liquidity in
the market. The equilibrium strategies of the traders therefore also take account
of the degree of illiquidity of the market. The solution for the threshold point
(3.5) shows that when c increases, the gap between v∗ and qi increases also, as
shown in figure 3.1. In other words, the when c is large, a trader’s trigger point v∗
is much higher than his true loss limit qi. The trader bails out at a much higher
price than his loss limit because he is apprehensive about the effect of other traders
bailing out. Just as in the run outcome in a bank run game, the traders in the
19
illiquid market bail out more aggressively when they fear the bailing out of other
traders. Since in our model the efficient outcome is for the risk-neutral traders
to hold the risky asset, the increase in c results in a greater welfare loss, ex ante.
This last point raises some thorny questions for regulatory policy. While the
trigger-happy behaviour of the individual traders is optimal from the point of view
of that trader alone, the resulting equilibrium is socially inefficient. In particular
when the loss limit of one trader is raised, this has repercussions beyond that
individual. For other traders in the market, the raising of the loss limit by one
trader imposes an unwelcome negative externality in the form of a more volatile
interim price. The natural response of the other traders would be to raise their
own trading limits to match. The analogy here is with an arms race.
More generally, when the endogenous nature of price fluctuations is taken into
account, the regulatory response to market risk may take on quite a different
flavour from the orthodox approach using value at risk using historical prices.
Danielsson, Shin and Zigrand (2002) and Danielsson and Shin (2002) explore
these issues further.
Appendix.
In this appendix, we complete the argument for theorem 1 by showing that
if qi > q∗, trader i prefers to sell, and if qi < q∗, trader i prefers to hold. For
this step of the argument, we again appeal to the conditional density over s. Let
us consider a variant of question (Q) for a trader whose loss limit exceeds the
threshold point q∗. Thus, consider the following question.
“My loss limit is qi and all others use the threshold strategy around
q∗. What is the probability that s is less than z?”
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The answer to this question will yield F (z|qi, q∗) - the probability that the
proportion of traders who sell is at most z, conditional on qi when all others
use the threshold strategy around q∗. When all traders are using the threshold
strategy around q∗, the proportion of traders who sell is given by the proportion of
traders whose loss limits have realizations to the right of q∗. When the common
element of loss limits is θ, the individual loss limits are distributed uniformly over
the interval [θ − ε, θ + ε]. The traders who sell are those whose loss limits are
above q∗. Hence,
s =
θ + ε− q∗
2ε
When do we have s < z? This happens when θ is low enough, so that the area
under the density to the right of q∗ is squeezed to a size below z. There is a value
of θ at which s is precisely equal to z. This is when θ = θ∗, where
θ∗ = q∗ − ε+ 2εz
We have s < z if and only if θ < θ∗. Thus, we can answer the question posed
above by finding the posterior probability that θ < θ∗.
For this, we must turn to trader i’s posterior density over θ conditional on his
loss limit being qi. This posterior density is uniform over the interval [qi − ε, qi + ε],
since the ex ante distribution over θ is uniform and the idiosyncratic element of
the loss limit is uniformly distributed around θ. The conditional probability that
θ < θ∗ is then the area under the posterior density over θ to the left of θ∗. This
is,










This gives the cumulative distribution function F (z|qi, q∗), which falls under three
cases.
F (z|qi, q∗) =













Hence, the corresponding density over s will, in general, have an atom at either
s = 0 or s = 1. Thus, let us consider qi where qi > q∗. We show that trader i
does strictly better by selling, than by holding. The conditional density over the
half-open inverval s ∈ [0, 1) is given by
f (s|qi, q∗) =
½
0 if s < qi−q
∗
2ε
1 if s ≥ qi−q∗
2ε




Meanwhile, from (2.7) and (2.8), the expected payoff advantage of holding













if s > ŝi
This payoff function satisfies the single-crossing property in that, u − w is non-
negative when s ≤ ŝi, and is negative when s > ŝi. The density f (s|qi, q∗) can





to the atom on point s = 1. Since
R 1
0
(u (s)−w (s)) ds = 0, we must
have Z 1
0
(u (s)− w (s)) f (s|qi, q∗) ds < 0
Thus, the trader with loss limit qi > q∗ strictly prefers to sell. There is an exactly
analogous argument to show that the trader with loss limit qi < q∗ strictly prefers
to hold. This completes the argument for theorem 1.
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